Key Research Findings
Based on research conducted between 1992 and 2008, Sanctions & Security researchers found
UN sanctions are most likely to succeed when:
1. the Security Council details a very clear and limited number of demands in the sanctions resolution
2. the sanctions adopted by the Council and its members are one component of a more multifaceted means of persuasion or coercion aimed at the target
3. the Sanctions Committee charged with oversight of the sanctions has an active and creative Committee chair, especially regarding travel to the sanctioned state/area
4. an internal or external expert committee monitors sanctions effectiveness and recommends improvements that are acted upon by the Council early in the sanctions episode
5. the Council has made provisions for humanitarian exemptions, if needed
6. the Council can accomplish the sanctions objectives within two years of the date of the original resolution
7. the Council and its member states have established a strong border or contraband monitoring and capturing system to enforce the sanctions
8. sanctions violators are identified and held accountable
9. a certain, more informal bargaining process emerges between the UN – either via the Council or its member states – and the target, regarding compliance
10. member states provide the target or actors within the target with some incentives for sanctions compliance that are consistent with the goal of the sanctions
11. member states have the capacity, and of course the willingness to implement the sanctions in their domestic legislation and legal enforcement mechanisms
12. the target believes that sanctions are fully supported by military force should sanctions fail.
UN sanctions are most likely to fail when:
1. sanctions are so excessively punitive that they isolate a target from continued bargaining with either the Council or member states
2. sanctions give targeted leaders a means to rally people around the flag, portraying the Council and its members as the offending party and deflecting attention from their own behavior
3. the Council or its members fails to recognize and engage a target who manifests partial compliance with sanctions
4. certain member states overtake the voice and role of the Council as leader of the sanctions process
5. successful application of economic coercion on the target has produced no change in the political behavior or compliance of the target